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1. Introduction
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS, PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL AND
OPTIMAL SCHEMES FOR PRIVATIZATION*
FRANCESCA CORNELLI




We analyze optimal schemes for privatization in a transitional economy. In many cases,
established Western firms are good candidates for large shareholders of a local firm,
since the sale of the shares can generate large amount of revenues and furthermore, in
the future, the home country can free-ride on the efficiency improvement of the firm.
However, not all Western firms are good owners. Some of them are more interested
in the private benefit of control than the potential of efficiency improvement. Such
Western firms are bad owners in the long run, although they may well be willing to pay
a high price to obtain the control right. Assuming that the government cares about a
convex combination of sales revenue and the future value of the firm, we show that the
optimal scheme is dependent upon the magnitude of the control benefit. Moreover,
we show that the number of shares sold is a crucial instrument to attract the most
efficient company.
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Privatization of state-owned enterprises in formerly socialist countries is a difficult undertaking.
The difficulty stems from the fact that ownership of the firm carries not only financial benefits
but also the control right of the firm. Therefore the efficiency and character of the privatized firm
will depend on who are the owners. This is to say that privatization is a much more complex
problem than just to give away or sell shares.
One of the central issues in privatization is the forming of large shareholders: in Western
economies they have proved to be indispensable to maintaining the efficiency of the firm. In many
circumstances, established Western companies can be ideal large shareholders for the privatized
firms, since they have access to advanced technology, well-established overseas financial markets
and relatively competent and skillful management teams.1 By holding the remaining shares of the
firm, domestic shareholders can benefit from the value improvement that the foreign companies
bring to the privatized firm. However, not all foreign companies are good large shareholders. Some
are interested in the private benefit of control which cannot be shared by local shareholders. For
example, they may want to deter future entry of other foreign companies in that new market
or exploit some synergies. If this is the case, the local firm will not become more efficient after
privatization.
In this paper, we are concerned with a situation where several Western firms want the control
right of a local firm. The government does not know their intentions and has to choose the most
appropriate buyer and how many shares of the firm should go with the control right. Unfortu-
nately, giving the control to the company willing to pay more may not necessarily be a good
choice, since the private benefits from control could be so high that the company offering more
would be a less desirable one. In general, the government finds itself in a trade-off between trying
to obtain the highest possible payment (the "revenue" objective) and identifying the company
which will operate better in the future (the "efficiency" objective).
We show that the number of shares sold is an important instrument for the government to
discriminate between different potential buyers. Given this result, we then show that it is often
sub-optimal for the government to commit in advance to selling a given fraction of the shares. By
making the number of shares sold depend on the actual offers, the government has more flexibility
to discriminate between companies which are efficient for the firm and companies that only aim
to high benefits from control.
We derive the optimal mechanism for the sale of control by solving an optimal auction design
'See, for example, Aghion and Burgess (1991).
problem. Compared with existing literature on optimal auction, our approach is more general,
since in our problem the seller has one additional instrument (the number of shares) to utilize.
This may be seen as an additional contribution of this paper.
In a heuristic way, the optimal scheme of privatization can be summarized as follows. When
the ratio of private benefits of control to the total public value of the firm is small, the government
should sell the minimum number of shares and sell them to the highest bidder, who will be the
most efficient company. When this ratio is high, the government still should sell the minimum
number of shares to the highest bidder, but in this case the highest bidder will be a company
with high benefits from control. This is the case in which the benefits from control are so high
that it is too costly to discriminate between different companies, therefore the government will
choose simply to maximize revenues.
In between the above two cases there is a trade-off between revenues and efficiency. It is
possible to discriminate between different firms at a cost of revenues. The main feature of the
optimal mechanism we propose is that the government will give the control to the highest bidder,
but offering more shares the higher is the winning bid. This last feature is the one that guarantees
that the highest bidder will be the most efficient firm.
Section 2 describes the objectives of the government and of the foreign companies. Section
3 tries to convey the main intuition of the paper with some simple numerical examples. Section
4 describes the model and looks for a set of necessary conditions on the optimal scheme in the
most general case. Section 5 then gives more detailed descriptions of the optimal privatization
scheme for some common cases. Section 6 concludes.
2. Government and foreign companies
We consider a government which wants to sell a large firm. Since the value of the shares of the
firm must be equal to the value of the whole firm minus the value of the debt, to the extent that
the firm's debt is secured and riskless, we will not lose generality by assuming in the rest of the
chapter that the firm is an all-equity firm. In order to better describe the model, we will first
discuss the objective function of the government and the nature of the large bidders.
2.1. The Objective of Government
Two leading alternative goals of privatization stand out among others. The first is to maximize
total revenues from the process of privatization. The second is to maximize the total value of
the privatized firm under the control of the new owner. From an economic point of view, Maskin
(1992) argues forcefully that the government should maximize the value of the firm. He called
this the efficiency objective. Kornai (1991) expressed the same view and justified it on the ground
of his social philosophy. Judging from limited observation of the practice of various countries, it
seems that this efficiency objective has been adopted by most governments.
On the other hand, revenues are also important to the government during the post-socialist
transition period. The main reason is that Eastern European countries will have to go through
a long and costly process of economic restructuring with major investments in infrastructural
facilities. Bolton and Roland (1992) point out that major budgetary problems may arise as a
larger share of the economy becomes private, since a greater fraction of the profits is not remitted
anymore to the state. To raise all these badly needed financial resources through borrowing
will be a burden too heavy for these countries. A second reason is due to privatization process
per se. As was explained by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), there are many incumbent claimants
to the control right of the firm and therefore the central government needs the revenues from
the privatization to bribe these claimants. Otherwise, privatization is politically impossible. A
third reason for maximizing revenues is also political. Public opinion is in general against selling
assets abroad, since it is feared that foreign companies may take advantage of the situation to
appropriate the already scarce capital of the country. High revenues may therefore be necessary
in order to justify internally the decision to give part of the ownership to foreign firms.2
To take into account both aspects, we assume that the government maximizes a weighted sum
of revenues and value. Since value maximization is most likely and economically most appropriate
for governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we assume the government gives
a heavier weight to value than to revenue maximization.
2.2. Large Bidders and Private Benefits of Control
The control right of a firm entitles the large shareholder to two kinds of benefits. Through its
intervention in the operations of the firm, the value of the firm may change and the benefit to the
large shareholder is proportional to the number of its shares. In addition, the large shareholder
may enjoy the control of the firm per se. This is called the private benefit of control. By definition,
this private benefit of control cannot be shared by other (minority) shareholders.
Private benefits of control can take many different forms. First, the controlling party can
change the objective of the firm to its own benefit. For example, a father company in control of
a son company can demand to get supplies at a price which is below the market price. Second,
there may exist synergies between the controlling party and the firm. For example, the owner of
'See Cornelli (1993).
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a local sports club can benefit from owning a local radio station which broadcasts the games of
the club.
In the transitional economies, private benefits of control to the foreign companies are likely to
be bigger than those in established market economies. In fact, in these economies the control right
usually gives the controlling firm enormous market power. For example, recently Fiat, Mercedes-
Benz and Volkswagen acquired majority stakes of several Eastern European car makers. GM
also attempted to buy shares of these car makers, as a part of its European strategy to take
full advantage of the new Pan-European market. These companies may not necessarily believe
that the acquired factories per se have great potential value. However, these acquisitions have
significant strategic value in allowing early entries to the East Europe car market. Sometimes, this
is also a way tocircumvent tariffs. For example, Heineken bought a majority stake in a Hungarian
brewery, so that local production facilities will enable it to get around quotas on foreign beers.
Let the public values of the firm under n different large buyers be v, va, ... , v,,, respectively.
The private benefits of control to each of the large shareholders are B1 , B2 , ..., B,,. Both v; and
B, are private information to large buyer i. Let a, be the proportion of shares that the large
shareholder obtains. For the large shareholder to get the control of the firm, a; must be at least
as big as a certain threshold level a. If a is the number of shares that the large shareholder
obtains with the control of the firm, then these a shares will be worth av+B to the large bidder.
The public value v is shared by the large and the small shareholders, while the private benefit B
is solely enjoyed by the controlling large shareholder.
We will focus on a situation in which the problem to identify the most desirable large share-
holder is particularly difficult. To show this, let us assume there are only two firms: firm 1 with
values (v1, Bj) and firm 2 with values (v2,B 2). If vi > v2 and B1 > B2, there is no trade-off
between the two objectives of the government: the company which can more effectively increase
the value of the domestic firm is also the one which is willing to pay more, whatever is the number
of shares sold a. It is straightforward to prove that the optimal mechanism for the government
would be to set up an auction to sell a shares to the highest bidder, which is also the most efficient
firm
However, assume that vi 2, but Bi < B2. Then the company willing to pay more is not
necessarily the most efficient one. In fact, it may be that for some ai, aivi+Bi < aie2+B2, but
for some other a2 > al, asvl + B1 > a2 2+ B2. If the government sets up an auction to sell al
shares, the highest bidder will be the company with the lowest value v, which is not necessarily
optimal from the point of view of the government. Therefore, in this case, there is a trade-off
between the two objectives of the government. For the rest of the paper, we will focus on this
case, i.e. one in which v; and B; are negatively related.
The parameters vi and B, can also be reinterpreted as characterizing foreign companies plans
when trying to obtain the control of the domestic firm. In other words, foreign companies may
want to obtain the control of the firm because they believe it has good opportunities to expand
and they want to invest in it, in view of future profits, or because they just want to exploit
the private benefits of control. Of course, the government does not know what are the plans of
each company. In general, we expect that v; and B, are negatively related. The more a foreign
company invests and increases the value of the firm, the less it will exploit the firm by abusing the
control right. This is particularly true if the private benefits of control are obtained by buying the
output of the domestic firm at a below-market price, or by diverting profits of the controlled firm
into profits of the controlling firm. The negative relationship between v; and B; could therefore
be interpreted also as a "possibility frontier" of the plans available to a foreign company.
2.3. The optimal a and the Voting Structure of Equity
Some remarks are due here about the number of shares a and the voting structure of the equity. In
the paper we generally assume a given structure of the shares, i.e. one-share-one-vote. However,
a can also be implemented by issuing two classes of equity: voting and non-voting. The number
of shares of the two classes are designed so that 50% of the voting shares are exactly a percent of
the total number of both classes of shares.3 Grossman Since we assume a exogenously given, one
may ask whether the government may want to manipulate ato its own benefit. As will be shown
later, in many cases the optimal a is independent of a, hence changing a is useless. Yet, in other
cases, the optimal a is equal to a. In these situations, there is an incentive for the government to
change a. Lowering a enables the government to retain more shares after privatization. However,
the controlling party may have less incentive to improve the efficiency of the firm, i.e. vi may be
lower. Thus, an optimal a can be found. In this paper, we are not concerned with such issues
and assume without loss of generality that a is already optimally chosen by the government.
In the Introduction we state that the paper shows that the number of shares sold is a crucial
instrument for the government. Another possible interpretation is that the voting structure of
the shares is a crucial instrument. In this sense, the result of this paper can be reinterpreted as
an extension of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988). They claim that when
the benefits of control are zero, one-share-one-vote is the optimal voting structure. In this paper,
we show how to optimally deviate from the one-share-one-vote rule, when the private benefits of
control are positive.
'Naturally, 50% could be substituted by the minimum percentage of voting shares necessary to gain the control,
according the charter of the irm, which is set by the government. In the extreme cases, it can be 100%.
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In reality, we do observe changing of voting structures as a result of privatization. For example,
the contract between Volkswagen and the government of Czechoslovakia implied the immediate
sale of 50% of the existing shares of Skoda to Volkswagen and one year later an issuing of
new shares. The amount of new shares that went to Volkswagen had been agreed so that in
the end Volkswagen would have owned 70% of total shares. Such procedure would allow the
Czechoslovakian government to modify the existing structure of the firm's equity by issuing new
shares, .
2.4. The payoffs
Now that we have characterized both the government and the foreign companies' interests, we
can express their payoff functions. Let us define p; as the probability that company i obtains the
control and ti the payment it has to make to the government. Then a foreign company maximizes
its expected payoff given by
E[(av, + B)p; - ti].
The government, on the other hand, maximizes a weighted sum of revenues and efficiency.
Following Maskin (1992) we say that the efficiency is obtained if the control is given to the
company which maximizes the value of the firm, i.e. to the company with the highest v,.
Since the most efficient firm is the one that maximizes the value of the shares remaining in
the hands of domestic shareholders, if A is the weight to the revenue objective, the government
maximizes its expected payoff:
E[A t + (1 - A) J(1 - a)vp;],
where 0 < A < }, since in general the government cares more about value (efficiency).4
Such an objective function is actually a simplified version of a general one. In general, the
government cares about expected revenues and total value of the firm, since the total value is
associated with employment and the country's economic development. However, selling abroad
has a cost in terms of lost future dividends. The objective function of the government would then
'We are here implicitly assuming that if the rm remains in domestic hands its value will be 0. As a result, the
government will always choose to sell the control to a foreign company. This assumption could easily be relaxed,
introducing a minimum threshold neessary in order to induce the government to sell the control abroad. For
simplicity, we ignore this issue in the paper.
be:
B aE ti + (1- A)[ - C()p
i
where C(av;) is a cost function.
In this case, even if a-= 1 the government may still care about the expected v;. If we assume
that such costs are linear, i.e. if C(av;) = 'yacv, with 0 < y 1, then the objective function
becomes:
E[AE ti + (1 - A) 1(1 - 'a)vp.]. (1)
When -y= 1-i.e. the cost is the highest possible-we are back to the previous function. We
use this simplified objective function in the following pages, since it is intuitive and most of the
results obtained remain true in general.'
3. Some numerical examples
In this section we present some numerical examples to give the intuition of why the mechanism
we suggest is optimal. We first assume that the number a of shares to be sold is chosen before
the actual sale and we show why the government may sometimes want to sell a number of shares
higher than the minimum necessary to have the control. As a second step, we show how the same
result can be achieved at a lower cost when the government makes the number of shares sold
contingent on the offers.
Let us assume that there are two potential buyers: buyer 1 has vi = 100 and BI = 40 and
buyer 2 has v2 = 130 and B2 = 20. In other words, buyer 2 is more efficient than buyer 1. On
the side of the government, we assume, for simplicity, that A = { and that the minimum number
of shares necessary to obtain the control right isg = 50%. Then the total willingness to pay of
each company, w', for different values of a, are given in the table.
Suppose that the government sells the a shares through an English auction. Then, if the
government decides to sell a = 50% shares, company 1 will win the auction with a bid of 85.
The payoff to the government is R = A85 + (1 - A)(1 - a)100 = 67.5. If the government sells
a = 65% shares, the buyer is again company 1 for a price of 104.5. The payoff to the government
is R = i x 104.5 + b x 35% x 100 = 09.75. If the government sells 70% of the shares, company 2
wins the auction with-a price of 110. The payoff is R = I x 1104+ + x 30% x 130 = 74.5, which
'Notice that we are assuming that A < }. Therefore, even if we set -=1, somehow minimizing the Importance
of vi, we can always compensate this by reducing A.
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wi'"
Company 1 Company 2
m v 1 =100, B 1 = 40 ,2 = 130, B2 = 20
a = 50% wi = avi + Bi = 90 w2 =at2+ B2 =85
a=65% 1 -av1 +Bj=105 w 2=a 2 +B 2 =104.5
a=70% 1=,avi+Bi=110 w,=av2+B2=111
is the highest.
It is clear why the value of a influences who wins the auction: when a increases, the willingness
to pay of company 2 increases more rapidly than that of company 1. By increasing the number
of shares the government influences the final result of the auction. Fom the point of view
of maximizing revenues, the auction is a very efficient way to sell the shares, since it allows
the government to extract the highest possible surplus from the companies, but it may end up
attributing the control to an inefficient company. By choosing both the selling procedure and the
number of shares to be sold, the government is able to reach the right balance among the two
objectives. As a result, the government has an incentive to sell more shares than the minimum
in order to maximize its own payoff.
We can intuitively explain why in this example the government prefers to sell more shares up
to 70%. First of all, so long as the shares are lessthan 70%, the winner is always company 1. In
these cases, given the rules of the English auction, the winner, company 1, has to pay company
2's willingness to pay. An increase in a by 1% makes company 2's willingness to pay increase
by 1% x wa = 1.3 and therefore, the winner (company 1) has to pay an extra of 1.3. Thus, the
government's payoff will increase by I x 1.3. However, there is a drawback of such an increase
in a, i.e. the government will have 1% less shares remaining in its hands after the auction and
the valuesof this is.1%v1 - 1% x 100 =1. Comparing benefits and costs of an 1% increase in a,
the government clearly wants to increase it. By the same argument, the government would not
increase a when a = 70%.
The next example brings out the key point of this paper, that is, the government can benefit by
*ro be precise, the maximum I reached at j, where w, = nt.
making a dependent on the bids. Until now we assumed the government first chooses the number
of shares to sell and then tries to sell them to the best buyer. When choosing a, the government
takes into account what happens in the second period, i.e. the result of the auction (or whatever
mechanism is optimal). In the second part of the paper, we show that the government can do
even better if it does not commit to selling a given a in advance but It sells a number of shares
contingent on the offers made by the companies.
To show this, let us continue with the above set-up. We suggest the following mechanism. It
is a sealed bid auction in which each bidder submits its bid secretly.7 If all the bids are lower
than 104.5, then the winner is randomly chosen among the bidders and has to pay a price of 89.5
and gets 50% of shares; if the highest bid is bigger or equal to 104.5, then the highest bidder
wins, pays an amount equal to his bid and gets 65% of shares. Moreover, the loser gets a transfer
t = 0.5.
Given this mechanism there exists a continuum of equilibria in which company 1 bids b1 E
[0,104.5) and company 2 bids b2 = 104.5. Let us first check that this is an equilibrium. If
company 1 bids b1 e [0,104.5), given the strategy of company 2, it always loses and therefore it
obtains a payoff of 0.5. If it deviates, the best it can do is to bid bi = 104.5+ e. In such case
it always wins 65% of the shares and pays its bid. The expected payoff is then 105 - b1 < 0.5.
Thus, company 1 has no incentive to deviate from its original strategy.
Let us now check the strategy of company 2. Company 2 of course has no incentive to bid
higher than 104.5, since it obtains a negative surplus if it wins. Moreover, if it bids be < 104.5,
with probability j it wins and has a surplus of 85 -89.5 = -4.5, while with probability j it loses
and receives a transfer of 0.5. Therefore, the expected payoff is negative.
Given these strategies, the government sells 65% shares to company 2 and its total payoff is
jx [104.5-0.51+j x 35% x 130 = 74.75. The government is better off with this mechanism than
the previous one of a = 70%. Further, whenever A < J-which is the most general case-the
advantage of the second mechanism is even larger.
Three features of this new mechanism are worth noticing. First, when all the bids are low, the
winner is randomly chosen and the payment is fixed. In the general mechanism, this corresponds
to "bunching" for low vis. When the highest bids are high enough, instead, the mechanism looks
like a sealed bid auction. Second, the number of shares a to be sold is a non-decreasing function
of the winning bid. Later, we will show that this feature is optimal for a class of situations.
'The choice of the two different mechanisms, one for the case where a is chosen es ante and one for the case of
an endogenous a, may seem arbitrary. However, in the general solution of the model we show that each of them is
the best possible mechanism for its corresponding case.
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Finally, notice that company 2 wins but has zero surplus, while company 1 loses and has a
positive expected payoff. In the general solution of the model we show that the expected profits
of the bidders decrease as vi increases and we give the intuition of such results.
maximizes the value of the shares, the government does not have to set a >; it may be enough
to let the number of shares sold increase with the winning bid. This is clearly an improvement:
the government achieves the same result by selling less shares abroad.
4. The model 4.1. The optimal selling procedure
In this section we introduce the formal model and characterize the government's problem. Until
now, we simply assumed that v and B; were negatively related. However, in order to make the
model more tractable and to have a better intuition of the results, we will assume that there is a
linear relationship between vi and B;, i.e.:5
BE = 1 -#v;." (2)
The problem of the government is to design an optimal scheme which maximizes its objective
function. By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict ourselves to studying only the direct
revelation mechanism. Let v be the vector of announced valuations, then pi(v) is the probability
that buyer i gets control; a;(v) is the proportion of shares buyer i obtains if he obtains the control
and t;(i) is the amount he has to pay.
The expected payoff to a large buyer i with value vi is
Ud(v,0, a, p, t) = J {(0:(vd, v...i) - #) v; + p;(v;, v...;) - ti(v;,V..)}g...(v-..)dv.i . (3)
The government's objective function is:
Thus, the willingness to pay of a buyer i who gets a shares can be re-written as
wi =avi+Bi =A+(a-#)v;.
If a(v;) is constant (or chosen ex ante), then ( = a - #. This means that if a </3, then
the willingness to pay decreases with vi; if a > /3, then it increases with vd; while if a = /3, then
it is independent from vd. It is easy to show that if a is chosen er ante, the optimal a is either
/#+ or a, depending on the value of the parameters and on whether the number of shares will be
sold through a Vickrey or English auction. The intuition is that to increase a is costly. Therefore
the government will do it only if in this way it will be able to attract a more efficient company.
For any a lower than /3 the winner of the auction will always be the less efficient company, i.e.
the one with the higher benefit of control. Then there is no incentive for the government to sell
more than a shares. Ib attract the most efficient company it is enough that a is slightly higher
than # and the government has no incentive to increase it even more. In Section 5 and 6 a more
complete analysis of the mechanism for the various cases will be done.
If instead the government has the option to make the number of shares sold a contingent on
the declared value v;, then = a;-#+cai. Thus, the willingness to pay may be monotonically
increasing in v,, even if a <(3. This means that if the government wishes to attract the buyer who
'More precisely, we do not need a linear relationship, but simply a relationship B, = h(v,), with h' < 0. For
simplicity, we assume here that h(-) is linear. Moreover, in Section 5.4 we discuss what happens if the government
does not know the relationship between vs and A.
In al the paper we assume that $ < 1. Empirical studies (see Barclay and Holderness (1989)) show in fact
that in general 9 is substantially lower than 1. In any case, the case of 9 > 1 would not add much to our analysis.
A L t;(v) + (1- A)x[1 - a;(v)]s;p;(C) g(C)dC. (4)
The government maximizes its objective function with respect to a, p and t subject to several
constraints. The individual rationality constraint
U, (v;, Li, Clip? 0 > 0, d: E N, dv: E [0, a]; (5)
and the incentive compatibility constraint
U(vi, vi, a,p,ft) 2: U(vi, i,a,p, t), Vi, E [0,0], Vi N, Vsd [0,0]. (6)
There are also other constraints. Fbr p,(v), its sum across all bidders must be less than or
equal to 1, since at most one bidder can obtain the control. Also, the number of shares to be








[vi[A(1 -. 3)+(1-2A)(1-Mv))M (11)
The incentive compatibility condition, constraint (6), entails a first order condition which is
necessary to guarantee that truth telling is optimal for all the bidders. Following Myerson (1981)
and Maskin and Riley (1990), we can show that the first order conditions can be transformed
into the following form:10
t;(v)g(v)d = ((a,(v) -#f)v + B] - [ac(v) -#]g)(vi)} p(v)g(v)dv - U(0,0) (9)
where q(vj) a is the reciprocal of the hazard rate of the distribution F(.) and UI(0,0)
is the expected utility of a bidder with vi= -0 when it announces its true vi.
This expression can be explained intuitively. The first term in the integral (ai(v) -#)v,+D Bis
the true evaluation of bidder i. However, the government cannot extract all of this from bidderi,
since it is costly to induce the bidder to tell the truth. Asa result, the bidder gets an informational
rent, which is Ui(0,0) + [ai(v) -#]g(vi)."
Constraint (9) is not sufficient to guarantee the incentive compatibility condition. In searching
for such a sufficient condition, we introduce a second order condition. The second order condition
requires that the function U(v., ii,a,p, t) is concave in vi at ; = vi.12 This second order condition
turns out to be:13
+ As - A (a.(v) -P)gq(v)pi(v) g()dv - EU(0,0).
Since all the potential buyers are risk neutral, there is no advantage for the government to
choose randomized outcomes.14 This may be seen also in equation (11) where the pis enter
linearly. Therefore, each p; will be equal to0 or 1. In the same way it is possible to prove that aj
is independent ofv..,. In fact, a. is the number of shares buyers obtains if he wins. Hence, ag is
defined only with respect to those vectors v such that i is a winner. Then, making ai dependent
on v. is equivalent to adding a randomization to a. Frhom now on, we assume that a, depends
only on v. 'Ib simplify the notation, we can then drop the subscript and write only a(vi).
Moreover, we define
P(vi)=_ p;(v)g-i(v..;)du...
which is the (unconditional) probability that bidder i wins the control right, given that its
valuation is vi. The second order conditions can therefore be written as
a'(v.)P(vu) + [a(vi) -P'(vi) >0,
Vi E N, Yv. E [0, ].
(12)
di c-N, Vt.,E [0, o).
(10)
Looking for the optimal policy, we can at first ignore the individual rationality constraint (5)
and solve the above problem. This will give us a solution pair ai,p;. Once we found such a
solution, we can use the following procedure to modify the t' s in order to satisfy the individual
rationality constraint. First, compute
Substituting equation (9) into (4), the objective function of the government can be transformed
spea long and detailed derivation, ses Appendix Al.
'Notice that the second term could be positive or negative.
'TO be precise, the second order condition only guarantees a local maximum. However, we will show that with
the optimalmechanisms the function U,(vi, ,a,pt) Is globally concave in 0, for all vi. This is enough to guarantee
that we reach a global-maximum.
"5 See Appendix Al.
yL = argnnU (vi, v). (13)
Second, increase or decrease tj(v) by the same constant (this is like re-scaling U4(0,0), which
is not necessarily the minimum in this context) so that Ug(Y,y.)= 0. Notice that such adjustment
"See Maskin and Riley (1990).
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in t,(v) is always possible according to (9).
'Ib summarize, we have Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The government's problem is to choose a and pi in order to maximize the following
objective function:
argued that in general, the government is more concerned with value than with the revenue (i.e.
A < 1).15 Therefore, if we ignore the incentive effect, increasing a from a is not a good strategy
for the government. These comments form the intuition of the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If constraint (15) is not binding for all vi, then the optimal a must be a(v) = a,
for all vi. If instead constraint (15) is binding for all vi and a(vi) and P(vi) are differentiable,
then the optimal a must be given by the differential equation
s(vha(v))p;(v)g(v)d,
subject to the followoing constraints:
(14)
a'(vi)P(vi)+ (a(v) -# I P'(vi) =0
a'(v.)P(v;) + [a(vi) - p] P'(v) ; 0;






Proof: We need to show that for the dynamic control problem defined in Lemma 1, a = a is the
optimal choice for a if constraint (15) is ignored. Rom the definition of #(vi, a), we have
(20)
since we assumed that 0 < A < {. Hence, the partial derivative of the objective function (14) of
the dynamic control problem with respect to a, given the optimal rule p;, is
(JSac Pv.av.)=(v ( v 12.~ (vi,a(vj))pi(v)g(v)dv <0. (21)




Thus, by the Maximum Principle, if constraint (15) on a is never binding, the optimal a is
g. On the other hand, constraint (15) always binding means, that the formula in (15) is always
satisfied with equality. Therefore we have the differential equation.
P(vi) J_, Pi(v)9-i(v-i)dv-i. (19) Q.E.D.
Constraint (15) holds for all v, at which a(vi) and P(v,) are differentiable.
Some remarks about the role of a are in order here. If we compare the problem with a
standard optimal auction (as in Myerson (1981), the government now has one more instrument
(a) to induce the bidder to tell its true willingness to pay. An increase in a has both positive
and negative effects on the objective function of the government. On the positive side, increasing
the number of shares sold generates more revenues from the auction. Let us call this the "sales
effect". Furthermore, such an increase in a may attract more efficient bidders (with higher vi).
This is called the "incentive effect". On the negative side, an increase in a reduces the value
of the remaining (unsold) part of the firm. This is called the "value effect". However, we have
When constraint (15) is ignored, in addition to setting a = g, the government would pick the
winner by finding the highest #(v;,g). If such a mechanism satisfies constraint (15), then the
government will adopt it. In other words, the government first best would be to sell the minimum
number of shares to the most efficient company. As we already showed, however, this is in general
not feasible. In fact, if the number of shares sold is low, often the company willing to pay more
will be the less efficient one. Only by selling a number of shares higher than the minimum the
government will be able to discriminate among the different companies.
"Moreover, since the government does not know the private information vs of each company, it will not be able
to extract all the rents of the private companies. Therefore, as a increases, the value part ofthe objectivedecreases,
while the revenues increase less than proportionally.
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If the second order condition (15) is not satisfied by the above unconstrained solution, then
the government has to fnd a different solution. In the standard literature on optimal auctions, if
the unconstrained solution violates the second order condition, a "bunching" solution is proved
to apply. This implies that instead of a regular auction, if all bidders announce their valuation in
a certain range, the seller picks the winner randomly.I6 This is equivalent to say that the optimal
P(v.) is modified (and set equal to a constant) in order to satisfy the second order condition. In
our case, however, if the second order condition are violated, there are two instruments that the
government can modify in order to satisfy them: a(v) and P(t). Instead of modifying P(v;),
the government can increase or decrease the number of shares offered if this is a less costly way to
satisfy the constraint. In particular, there are many ways to modify the optimal mechanism: the
government can make a contingent on v;, or it can change the optimal rule P, or both. Finding
the optimal selling procedure in this case implies finding the right balance between these two
instruments.
5. Three Representative Cases
We will focus on three representative cases that are illustrative of the procedure the government
should follow. These cases correspond to important economic environments and have clear inter-
pretations. The first two cases are sub-cases of g < #, which means # is not too small. The third
case is just the opposite. In the first case the government prefers not to attract the most efficient
company. In the second and third case it does, but while in the second one the government has to
offer more shares the higher is the bid, in the last one it is enough to offer the minimum number
of shares.
5.1. The case of #(v,g) monotonically decreasing in v,
In this case and the next one we assume that/# > g, which means that if the government sells only
the minimum number of shares in a normal auction the highest bidder will be the less efficient
company. In other words, there is a trade-off between the revenue and the efficiency objectives.
The assumption that #(v,g) is monotonic decreasing in vi is equivalent to assuming
A(1-#_)+(1- 2A)(1 -2)
where q(.) is the reciprocal of the hazard rate of distribution f(.). It can be easily checked that
"See Gueinede and Lafront (1984) and Maski and Riley (1991).
this condition is more easily satisfied the higher # and A are.
The optimal selling procedure in this case is quite simple and the following proposition gives
a full description.
Proposition 2 If 4(v;, g) is a monotonically decreasing function oftv;, then the government will
give a shares to the firm declaring the lowest vi.
Proof: From Proposition 1, if we ignore constraint (15), the optimal choice is a = a. Since 4(ve,g)
is, by assumption, decreasing in vi, setting pi = 1 for the lowest v; is the policy that maximizes
the objective function. On the other hand, such a policy implies P'(vj) < 0. Therefore, constraint
(15) is indeed satisfied. , rom (18), #(vi,g) is always positive, so no reservation prices are needed.
Q.E.D.
A remark is due here. From the optimal choice of a and pi, as described above, ti can be
determined from the first order condition (9), if U(0,0) is specified. The specification of Ue(0,0)
is obtained from considering the individual incentive constraint (5) which has been ignored so
far. We can find U.(0,0) in this case rather easily. From the incentive compatibility constraint
(6), by the Envelope Theorem, we have:
dv i = [ai(z) - #]P(z) (22)
Therefore,
U,(v,v) = "[a(z) -#JP(x)dz+ U(0,0) (23)
Given the optimal choice of p; and a, the expected utility of a bidder is decreasing with v;
and 9 has the lowest expected payoff, which should be set to be 0 by the government. Therefore,
if the government sets
U;(O,0) = (# - 2) 1i - F(z)]"-'z,
then all bidders' utilities are bigger than 0 and the individual rationality constraint is satisfied.
The intuition of the above optimal scheme is rather simple. When A is high, the government
cares relatively less about value and more about revenues. When/# is high, the bidder's willingness
to pay for a shares, N+ (a -#/)v; is likely to decrease at a high rate as v, increases. Thus, to be
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sure that the company which obtains the control has a high vi, the government should offer a large
a. This may prove to be too costly and the government may not find it worthwhile to attract
bidders with high values and instead will prefer to sell the minimum number of shares. Thus, the
government prefers to maximize the revenue component of its objective function instead of the
value part.
A simple mechanism to implement this result is a Vickrey or an English auction where the
government commits to selling g shares to the highest bidder. Since 4(vi,g) is decreasing, the
highest bidder will be the individual with the lowest vi.
Clearly, if the government had chosen a ex-ante, the same mechanism would have been chosen.
Therefore, in this case the government does not gain by making a dependent on the bid, i.e. it
could have just pre-committed to sell a fixed number of shares before the auction starts.
5.2. The case of 4(v,, a) monotonically increasing in vi for any a
The second case we consider is the opposite to the one above. This case is likely to arise when
A is low -the objective of revenue is less important - and /3 is low - the trade-off between
benefits of control and value of the firm is not sharp. The case is defined by assuming that 4
is monotonically increasing with vi for any a which is constant in the range [0,4v].17 This is
equivalent to assuming that for any constant a
A(1-Q))+ (1- 2A)(1 -a)
9'(v;) > (_g -A (a - 3)
Before analyzing the optimal selling scheme, in which a can vary with the winning bid, let us
confine ourselves to schemes in which a is chosen ez ante.
Proposition S Assume that 4,(vi,a) is monotonically increasing in vi. If the government has
to commit to selling a fixed number of shares a before the auction starts, then it is optimal for
the government either to commit to selling a shares and then randomly choose the winner or to
commit to selling /# shares and then conduct an English auction.
Proof: We first have to consider the second stage of the game and find the optimal way to sell
the a shares. When a is constant, constraint (15) becomes
[a - p]JP'(vt) > 0.
"Of course, this is only a sufficient condition and not a necessary one for the followingmechanism to be optimal.
The unconstrained optimum would be to set pi(v) =1 for the company declaring the highest
v,, since 4(v,a) is monotonically increasing with vi. If the a chosen es ante is higher or equal to
#, then the constraint is satisfied and this is the optimal direct mechanism. However, if a </3,
then the solution violates the constraint. As in the standard literature of optimal auctions, it is
not difficult to show that in this case the optimum would be to set P'(vi) = 0 over all the interval,
i.e. to give the control randomly.
Now let us consider the first stage, when a is chosen, and compare the overall payoffs to the
government. Flom Lemma 1, it is easy to show that the expected payoff to the government is
(see Appendix A2, equation (035) ):
n 4(v,)P(vs)f(vi)dv;. (24)
If a > /3, we just showed that P(v,) = F"
1
(v,). The payoff then becomes:
[A(1 -#) + (1- 2A)(1 - a)] vidF"(v) + a- dF"(v;) - A(a -# 1 j dP"(v;).
Notice that the derivative of this payoff with respect to a is strictly negative. Therefore, the
government would set a =#l3+ and the payoff becomes:
(1 - a)(1 - A)E(v(l)) + AD, (25)
where v(1) is the highest order statistics and E(v(1)) = 6 -fo[F(v.)]"dz. If a </3, P(va) = nand
the expected payoff is
[A(1 - ) + (1 - 2A)(1 - a)]j vdf(v) + A dF(vi) - A(a -,/)f - dF(v)
which turns out to be:
18
(1 - a)(1 - A)E(v1 ) + AD. (26)
This is maximized by setting a = g. Obviously, the optimal a is either #+ or g. Depending
'Using the fact that f01i- F(z)]dr = z[1 - F(z)]|b'+ f zdF(x) = E(v).
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on the value of the parameters both could be the best, since E(v(1)) > B(v3) but (1-g) > (1-0).
Q.E.D.
When a can vary with the bid, however, the government can do better by not committing to
a fixed a and always succed in attarcting the most efficient company. In the following proposition
we show that the government always sells strictly less shares if a is endogenously determined.
Proposition 4 If #(vj,a) is monotonic increasing with vi for any a, then a*(vi) < # for any vi.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
We can now characterize the optimal a*(v) and p (vj).
Proposition 5 If #(v,a) is monotonically increasing in v, for any a, the optimal scheme of
privatisation is to vundomly assign the control right among the bidders if only low vi s are declared
or, if there is some higher vi, to give the control right to the company declaring the highest vi. In
the former ease, the control right is won with a number of shares. In the second case, the control
right carries a share a which is positively dependent on the winner's declared valuation v;.
Proof: See Appendix A3.
The elaborate characterization of the optimal scheme is presented in Appendix A3. Here we
want only to describe its main features. First of all, it is shown in Appendix A3 that the optimal
a*(qd) and P*(v;) are linked over the entire interval (0,aJ by the relationship
that gives the bidder the highest v; the control right. The optimal scheme will therefore look like







It is easy to show that an indirect mechanism implementing this optimum would be the
following. All the foreign companies make a bid. If all the bids are below a predetermined level,
then the minimum number of shares a is given to one of them at random. If at least one bid
is above that level, then a* shares will be given to the highest bidder, where the actual a* will
depend on the winning bid (according to a function derived from the relationship (27)).
A major feature of this optimal scheme is the increasing a which serves as an important
screening device to induce truth telling from the bidders so that the government is able to choose
the most efficient company. If a company makes a high bid, it obtains more shares and a higher
probability to win but the price also increases more than proportionally.
19 In this way, bidders
with high v, would not make a low bid, since they are attracted by the high a which increases
their willingness to pay av;+B;. Also, they are attracted by the higher probability to win. At the
same time, a bidder with low vi would not bid high, since its low v; cannot make its willingness
to pay av; + B. increase as rapidly as the price.
However, increasing a is costly and it is not always optimal to give the control to the most
efficient firm. The government faces a trade off between attracting the most efficient company
and minimizing the number of shares sold. If it gives the control randomly, the government can
keep a constant. The loss is given by the fact that sometimes the winning company may not
be the one with the highest value, while the gain is given by the low number of shares sold.
The government will give the control randomly if all the ves are below a certain amount. As
"You can see this in the example given in Section 3.
where to is negative (since we just showed that a*(v;) < # everywhere) and is set so that a*(0) =
a:
co = (a -3)P*(O). (28)
Moreover, it is possible to show that there always exists a 0 > 0 such that for any v; E [0,0]
a*(vi) = g and P*(vi) is constant (and determined by equation (27) ), while for any v; E [v, ]1
P*(v,) = F"-1 (vj) and a(vj) is strictly higher than a and given by equation (27).
A constant P*(vi) over an interval [0,0] means that all bidders who declare a v; in that interval
have the same chance to win. On the other hand, P(v.) = F"-
1
(v;) is implemented by the rule
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vi increases, the cost from not separating different types becomes larger and larger, while the
decrease in a*(v;) is reduced. Therefore the government will prefer to increase a and attribute
the good to the highest bidder.
5.3. The Case with 3 < a
If 3 < a, the term a - /# is always positive. This is the case in which the trade-off between
benefits of control and to the total public value of the firm is low. Thus, by offering the mini-
mum proportion of shares, the government can already attract the most efficient company. The
standard optimal auction literature can apply here.
Proposition 6 If# < a and the hazard rate q(v) is monotonic increasing with vi, then the
government gives a shares to the firm with the highest vi, if vi > v* where v* is such that
#(v*, a)= 0.
Proof: The proof is standard, once we notice that in such a case (v;,,g) is a monotonically
increasing function of v, and therefore constraint (15) is never binding.2o
The government does not lose anything by pre-committing to selling a fixed number of shares.
An optimal mechanism is for the government to sell a shares in a Vickrey or an English auction,
with the reservation price given by B + (a - 3)v*. Therefore, the optimal mechanism is very
simple and easy to use. Moreover, this case is particularly successful , since the government can
attract the highest possible vi with the minimum necessary shares. This is exactly because there
is a small trade-off between the two objectives of revenue and efficiency.
5.4. Discussion
In Section 2 above we introduced a relationship between the vs and the Bis of foreign companies
and suggested that such relationship could also be interpreted as an "efficiency frontier". Later,
to keep the exposition simple, we assumed that such relationship is linear. Moreover, throughout
the paper we assumed that such efficiency frontier is common knowledge. One possible objection
to the latter assumption, however, comes from the fact that the government may not know the
shape of this frontier exactly. Therefore, in this section we ask how the mechanism we suggest
would perform if the government does not know such relationship.
"Monotosicityof the hazard rate isa standardashsumption i the literature of optimal auctions and it is satised
by most of the typical distributions. Whenever it is not satisfed the usual problems of incentive compatibilityarise.
Fbr simplicity, we Ignore here such case.
The characterization of the optimal mechanism when the government does not have perfect
information about such relationship is a formidable task, moreover the formal treatment would
allow at most a very general characterization of the mechanism. In an attempt to obtain more
precise predictions on the form of the optimal mechanism we will characterize such a mechanism
under the assumption that the relationship is common knowledge and then will ask what is the
robustness of the mechanism constructed.
For simplicity, we consider a particular case: the government knows that the relationship
between v; and B; is linear, but /3 could take two values-3i </#2-and the government does
not know which one is the exact value of P. First of all, as long as the government construct the
mechanism on the basis of a # higher than the true one, the incentive compatibility constraint is
always satisfied. In fact, assume the true / = 31 and the government chooses to sell according
to the mechanism given in Proposition 5 with /3 = #2. This means he would choose P*(v;) =
F"-(vi) and
a(vi)= /2 +
Constraint (15) would therefore become:
(#2 - 31)P'(vi) > 0
which is clearly satisfied. Therefore the mechanism would still work and attract the most efficient
company, but the government would sell more shares than it is actually necessary. If p is the
probability that /3 = #2, then when the government chooses #2, with probability p it choose the
right /3 and the objective function is maximized. However, with probability 1 - p, /3 = /3. In
such a case, it is possible to show that the value of the objective function is the same as in the
first case, with the only difference that the government could have done even better. In other
words, choosing a # too high does not have any effect on the efficient choice of the buyer.
The question is then whether in the presence of uncertainty the government could have done
much better with another mechanism. For example, we can show that the mechanism proposed
in Section 5 will always do better than a normal auction in which the government sells a fixed
number of shares. If #(v,) is decreasing for both p3 and P2, then we showed in Proposition 2 that
there is no difference between these two mechanisms. Assume instead that #(v;) is increasing
for both /3u and #2 and the government has chosen to sell #; shares through an auction. Then
the mechanism proposed in Proposition 5 will do strictly better. In fact, if/3, is actually higher
or equal to the true /# we have already shown that the second mechanism is strictly better. If
instead A, is lower than the true one, then both mechanisms would end up attracting the less
efficient firm, but while in the first case the government would still sell P; shares, at least with the
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mechanism we suggested the government would sell only a shares.2 ' Finally, if 4(vi) is decreasing
for #2 and increasing for #t, a combination of the two arguments above would still prove that the
mechanism given in Proposition 5 is strictly better.
The essence of such discussion is the following. Even when the government does not know
$, the mechanism still performs quite well. In fact, even if we have not identified the optimal
mechanism, the one we propose can still do better than other simple mechanisms. The cost for
the government is that it may end up selling more shares than it is actually necessary. However,
since the mechanism is specifically designed in order to sell the minimum possible number of
shares, this cost is not too high.
6. Conclusions
The focus of this paper is the optimal scheme of privatization. In the privatization of formerly
state-owned industrial firms, Western firms and investors are often good candidates to be large
shareholders of the privatized firm, since they can increase the efficiency and value of the privatized
firm. However, since the control right per se can be of great value, many foreign investors want
to buy shares just because of the private benefit of control. Such investors are not necessarily
suitable for the domestic firm.
The optimal privatization scheme can be much more complex than an ordinary auction. There
are several reasons for this. First, unlike a simple auction where the seller only cares about the
revenue, here the government cares about a combination of the revenue and the value of the firm.
Second, compared with a standard auction, the government can vary the number of shares to be
sold as an additional instrument to give incentives to large buyers to reveal their true values.
We are able to characterie such optimal schemes for several important cases. If the ratio of
private benefit of control (B;) to the total public value of the firm (v;) is always smaller than a
(the minimum proportion of shares that entitles the buyer to the control right), then a simple
English auction is optimal and the government should offer the minimum amount of shares. This
implies that consideration of the private benefit of control does not have any effect on the optimal
scheme of privatization. Outside the above scenario, we study the situation where the trade-off
between v; and Bi can be approximated by a linear function. We show that if the ratio & is high,
then in general the optimal scheme is to sell only the minimum amount of shares to the foreign
bidder and to give the control right to the bidder with the lowest vi. On the other hand, if the
ratio Ais low (close to a), then the government should randomly assign the control right when
sP an Proposition 1 we know it Is Sever optimal to increase o.
all bids are low and give the control to the highest bidder when there are high enough bids. At
the same time, in this case the government should gradually increase the number of shares sold
with the announced u. We are also able to show that by not committing to sell a given number
of shares ex ante the government is able to achieve a better outcome than otherwise.
The same approach could be used also for the privatization of public firms in Western
economies. The basic points of this paper are also relevant in these countries, since the gov-
ernment cares relatively more about the future value of the privatized firm than revenue, and also
private benefits of control are present. Moreover, governments involved in privatizations are very
often concerned with problems of concentration or monopolization of an industry. It can therefore




Al The Derivation of the First Order Condition and the Second Order Condition
(NOTE to Editor: Appendix Al can be eliminated or reduced it space is a concern.)
The incentive compatibility constraint can be expressed a:
Vi= argo , J /{ a(iu v- A f- i u]i(v'i, v) - t(i id v-id}9-itJ)dU-i" 
((Dfn
U .(u , z ) . ja [ : .v ..,)vi + B - IlvJ]p .(: i. v...) - t,(z , v i)}2 -s(v -iO dv -i. (C
Assuming different'iability, the envelope theorem gives
Jvi [aazsjuvi. u= , - (i vzu)v.) v- i)dv.-i. (
Since :i(vi) = vi, this becomes
=v (iVi a,(vi., V-j)- 1A pidvi, v..j)g-(v-j)dv-.. (C
Integrating further, f--Vhave)r
JWv~
1 , d{ [ai(va+ B -3viJ pa(v~v.) -
J [cx(z, -)- pi(z, t...)dx z dVjd-dd





Re-integrating it, we get:
Ui(us,v4) =jA p o.z~d -v(z,t1-;)-.d(vsdv-idz + UdO,O).
Comparing the above expression for Uj(v., vi) and its definition, we have:
(033)
j [ai~viv. +0B - Pvi] pi(v)g(v)dv -
j .. (v~j) j g(vi) f o(z.V..j) - fl]pidzvji)dzdvjdv~j.
The second integration in the expression above can be further simplified as the following.
j g..j(.) j gQ0i) j [aii v-i) -- i1]i(:i iv-j)dz~dvjd...
j 9-i.~v_1j) jdGduvi) J (i,v~i) - JP p (zv.i)dzdv~i
-=j 9-.(vi){C(v)J (oi~z, -) -- ,3I~(', v-)dz:
-jGj(vi)[ciiu,v-.i) + - Plis(vui v-)dv:}dV~:
= J gq(v..) {jV(dzv~) - /ip(z, v- .dz -
vJ ~vfla vv )- 19 p'(vi, vui)dvi}dv~i
vVJ g(i) v L J - ga C 9'(vi) d
[aiv P.Od)Vd(
Notice that in the above derivation, the independence of the distribution of vile is utilized. MAo, b~y
definition, gi(vi) = /(vi) and G:(u:) = F(vj).
Let
g3()s:1 v ) a j.(v)
where the reciprocal of q(.) is customarily called the hazard function of the distribution f(.). To summarize,
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or
j_ {lai., v-i)v' + AD- Jvijp(v, v.i)- iv v) -i-id-
j [Jlea~z~- a .4J(z.v..i)d4 -i( v-i)dv-i + U.(9, 0),
j t.-(v..iv.)dv..i =
+-f ipi(vj, v...) - j ad:z, v.i) - Pjpi(z,v-d -i-iv-
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the expected payment from bidder i is:
jt()g(v)dv [ag(v)vj + a -v3j - [ag(v) - 3g(v)} pj(u)g(v)dv.
This i. the expression that was quoted in the paper.
As for the second order condition, it is frac
But, according to the frst order condition,
W ,', 0.
Differentiating this first order condition on both sides with respect to 6j, we have
80U(vg,6j) 8U(va , Q
Therefore, a second order condition can be found as:
02U4(vie, 4) 0.
(034)
tinuous point, we cannot use condition (15) to check the incentive compatibility constraint. The following
lemma gives us a more general condition which aows for discontinuities.
Lemma 02 Suppose that a(vj) and P(va) are discontinuous at a point t, i.e. a(v) # a(v~) or P(v ) #
P(vs~). Then the second order condition of the incentive compatibility constraint at the point ws becomes
P(v;)(a(v;) - ) - P(vi )(a(vi) - 0) 5 0. (036)
Proof: Notice that to the left and to the right of the point ua, a(vi) is continuous and therefore the usual
incentive compatibility constraint holds in this region. Moreover, al the derivations in the last section will
hold for these intervals of vi, since there is no non-differentiability problem. In particular, the derivation
for the optimal expected transfers is valid.
Define
Ui(vi, zi) u j {[(a(ziv..d) -13)vs + APi(zi,V..4-) - ti(ziV..)g-i(v-j)dv-
Combining equation (037) and the expression for the expected transfers, we get
Ui(vi, zi) = [(a(zi) - 0) v;f+ AD]pd(zj, v..) - ty(zy, ..g) g-i(v..)dv-j
(037)
This second order condition turns out to be
= V [(a(z ) -#)c; i gz~.g)gggd..
{!pi(v)+ ag(v)-# ]!ig...3(v...)dv.. 2 0,
Vi EN, YVtg e10,01.
A2. Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1
In what follows it will be convenient to use a transformed form of the government objective function.
Note that the distributions of vy's are independent and a-and therefore 4-is a function of vi only. Also,
all players are, es ante, symmetric. Thus, using the definition of P(vy) given in equation (19), the objective
function of the government can be rewritten as
n. (vi,a(s))P(s)(vs)de. (035)
Step 2
The first problem that arises is that the optimal medianism may have discontinuities. At each discon-
- J {[(a(z+) -1)z + Ap(zi,v..) - [a(s) -1jp(s, v...)ds} g-(v-)dv-f
+Ui(0,0).
Using the definition of P(z) given in equation (19) we can rearrange the above expression as:
U,(v6, zi) = P(z.) [a(zi) -31j(vi - zi) + j[a(s) -31 P(s)ds+ U5(0,0). (038)
Suppose that an individual with valuation vi = yr - e declares a value z = s + e. His gain in doing
so is
G = Uj(us - e,ve +e) - UI(ve - e, v - e)
= P(s +e) [a(vo +e) -031(-2E) + [a(s) - 1P(s)ds
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The second term in the last expression can be re-written as
[a(s) - Q] P(s)ds + [a(s) -13]]P(s)ds
which by Cauchy theorem Is equal to,
(039)
[a((i) -1]P(C)e +[a(C2) - Al]P(C2)e, (040)
where v- e C (l Cv5 and vo 5 ( :5 Cs + e. When e -0,( 1 -( vo and (s-+ vo . Therefore, if we
define P+ P(v), P- * P(v ), a+ = a(vo) and a- a(vf), then G/e converges to
P-(a~-# ) - P+(a+ - p). (041)
Therefore, we need to require that the expression above is non positive. Notice that if e is negative,
then G/e is non-positive and P+ and a+ should be written as P- and a-. Hence, the expression above
holds whether an individual declares a lower type or a higher type.
Q.E.D.
From now on, whenever we want to check the incentive compatibility constraint, we will use condition
(15) if there are no discontinuities or condition (036) if there is a discontinuity.
Step 3
We can now show that the government will never offer a number of shares higher than 0.
Lemma 03 a(vi) > 1 for some vi is never optimal.
Proof: Let us suppose first that a(vi) becomes higher than # only through a discontinuity, i.e. there does
not exist an interval [v',v 2j over which a(v.) is continuous, a(v') < 3 and a(v2) > 13 (or vice versa,
a(v') >13 and a(v2) <13). Then let us take the interval of vis for which a(v,) >13 and give it a(v,) =3.
To guarantee incentive compatibility it will be enough to give all of them the same P as before. In fact,
from equation (036) it is evident that whenever there is a jump from a- - # negative to a+ -1# positive,
the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with a strict inequality for any P+. Moreover, this is
true also if a+ -13 = 0. Therefore, if we give to these vi the same P, the incentive compatibility at the
discontinuity is satisfied. Moreover, in the interval of vis we set at a(vi) =13, the incentive compatibility
is satisfied too, since a' = 0 and a -13= 0 make the differential condition (15) always satisfied.
The new scheme is strictly better for the government, since the shares sold have decreased and the
choice of the winner has not changed. To see this, consider equation (035). It is clear that with this scheme
the government has lowered a(z) (and therefore increased #(z, a(z))) for some values of z and it has not
changed any P. Therefore, the government is strictly better off.
Now, let's verify that it is impossible for a to have a downward jump from higher than O to lower than
1. From (036), so long as one of P- and P+ is positiven, a jump from a- -3 positive to a+ -3 negative
is never incentive compatible. Therefore, we can ignore downward jumps.
Finally, let us check the continuous case. Suppose that there exists an interval [v,vs] in which a(va)
is continuous and a(v') >13 for some visin that interval. This cannot be optimal, since the government
can do better by setting a(vi) = 1 for those vi while keeping the old P(v). The incentive compatibility
constraint is still satisfied, because (15) holds strictly.
Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 2 shows that the government can always do better than setting a(vi) >1# since
it can always set a(vi) =13 and leave the same P(vi), which remains incentive compatible.
Step 4
We are now left with only two possibilities: a =3 or a <1P. To show that a <13 for all vj's, we need
first to prove that 4(9v,a*(vi)) is monotonic increasing in vi.
Lemma 04 If 4(vi,a) is monotonic increasing with vi for any a constant, then 4(v,a*(v)) is also
monotonic increasing in vi. Moreover, with a'(vi)), constraint (15) (or (036)) always holds with an
equality at all vis.
Proof: Let us only deal with the case where a(v.) is continuous at vi and the constraint (15). The same
logic can be exactly applied to the discontinuous case and constraint (036).
First of all, notice that
d4 00 00da
dvi = vi Oa dvi~
The first term on the right hand side is always positive by assumption, while the partial derivative
in the second term is always negative by formula (20). Therefore, # can be negative only if >0.
Suppose # < 0, from constraint (15)
a'*(v;)P(v) + (a*(vi) - 13)P'(va) >0.
The first term on the left-hand-side is positive, since we are assuming that a'*(vi) > 0. We know
that a*(vi) <10. Given that 4' < 0, optimality requires that P'(vi) < 0 (i.e. to give a higher ¢ a higher
probability to win). Therefore, also the second term must be positive. In other words, the constraint is
satisfied with a strict inequality. Therefore, the government can always do better by slightly reducing I
b
2 
Weignore the case of both P+ and P- equal to 0, since the government would never give the control to such
bidders.
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so that it is still positive and the constrainis still not violated. This is a contradiction to the fact that a*
is optimal.
Ljom the proof above, we have also verified the last claim in the lemma.
a = 0 is never optimal.
QE.D.
A3. Proof of Proposition 5Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 3 shows that it is never optimal for the government to increase the number of
shares sold (as vi increases) so fast that the function # becomes decreasing with vj. Lemma 3 implies that
constraint (15) (or (036) if there is a discontinuity) is always binding.
Step g
We can now show that the optimal a is indeed always less than #.
Proof: First, in any intervals where a is continuous and differentiable, either a <i0 everywhere or a a P.
From the last lemma, in each of such intervals, constraint (15) holds strictly, i.e.,
a'(vi)P(vi) + (a(vi) - #)P'(v.) = 0,
which gives
Step 1
The first step is to transform the problem into a tractable optimal control set-up. The following lemma
shows that the optimal a*(vi) and P*(va) are linked by the same relationship for al the interval 10,0).
Lemma 05 Suppose that u(va,a) is monotonically increasing in vi for any a constant and that a(v ) and
P(vi) rep'esent the optimal choice of the govsernment, then ther exists a constant ce <0 such that for all
Vi,
a Pva=#+ )
Proof: LFtom previous lemmas, we know that (042) must hold at all vi where a(ve) and P(ve) are differ-
entiable. If in the whole range of (0,0), a(vj) and P(vj) are differentiable, then the second order condition
will give the relationship in the lemma. What needs to be proved is the case where either a(vj) or P(vj)
are not differentiable at a point vs. Without losing generality, let us onlConsider that such a vs is the
largest of its kind.
In the neighborhoods of vi to the left and the right of t we know that the differential equation
a'P + (a - 3)P'=0 holds. Therefore, there exist constants ci and c,, such that
a= =#+ , o <tis
and
a(vi) : A+ . (042)
whereais given by the Initial condition. IfIn the beginning of the interval a(0) < j, thence is
negative. But then, a(v.) is bounded above by 2+ ca.
Therefore, we are left with only two possibilities: either a = # for the whole interval (0,0) or a
reacsa # via a-discontinuous point. Let us consider this second possibility and call such a point us, where
a(vi) < # for vi <vwe and a(va) = $ for vi > vs. Notice that P(v;) cannot be equal to 0, since this would
imply, from (042), that a(vi)= -oo. Therefore from equation (036) we obtain
P(4i) SP.-
Whatever is the original P(vt) we want to keep, we can always find an a+ <P but near enough to
# to make the above inequality hold. For the remaining points in this interval, we keep again the same P
and we modify a following the solution to the differential equation, I.e.
By the argument above, all these a will be below r. Moreover, the government is doing strictly better,
since # has been increased for some i and P has not changed.
Henea = $ is possible only If It is true over all the interval10,0). But also In this case, the government
can always set a lower initial condition and increase a so that the constraint is always satisfied. Therefore
a apva>vs.
These give the following;
p(i)(C+- 0) = oz.
Thus, according to lemma 2, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes:
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Cl : C.
If ci < c, then the government could have done better by setting cs = ci, since this way a(vi) will be
smaller to the right of vs. Thus, cl = e s co. Therefore, (042) holds at all points.
Q.E.D.
Step 2
We now have to transform the constraint in order to write down the optimal control problem. According
to Proposition 4, the optimal a(va) must be such that a(va) < /. In other words, the constraint a < 1 is
never binding. We can ignore this constraint from now on. The constraint a > a becomes:
"(v) 2 0
since this is true for any y.
Step 3
To summarize, the problem of finding the optimal a(va) and P(vj) becomes
masxn j4 (v,a(vi))P(vi)f(v)dv
at. '(v) = (P) - (v))f(v)






Moreover, there is another very important constraint on P(v.). P(v.) is the probability that bidder i
wins the auction unconditional on other bidder's valuations. It is derived from the conditional probability
pt(v). However, pt(v) does have a constraint, that is Ejp(v) < 1. Such a constraint should be translated
into a constraint on P(vu). To put it another way, one has to put a constraint on P(v;) so that P(vj) can
be integrated back to pj(v). Fortunately, the constraint on P(vj) is not too complicated. It has been found
by Maskin and Riley (1984). To repeat their condition, here is lemma 5.
Lemma 00 (Maskin and Riley (1984)) The necessary condition for a family of symmetric permutation








This is not a typical optimal control problem, since in addition to the state equation, there are algebraic
constraints on both the state variable w and the control variable P. To proceed, we use a mixture of
Lagrangian and Pontryagin methods (see Takayama (1985), pp 646-651, for a formal exposition). First,
define a generalized Hamiltonian (a is substituted away):
H(s, P, A,, As, As) = (v)P(v )f(v;) + A,(P(vt) - F"'(v))f u) + As + As(#+ - a),
where Ai, A,, and A3 are the co-state variable, multiplier of constraint w > 0 and multiplier of constraint
a > a, respectively. A set of necessary conditions on the optimal a(va) and P(va) is the following.
In order to utilize the Maskin-Riley condition, deine a new function a(-):
P(vi)f(vj)dva - j F"-1(vi)(vi)f(vi)dvi + s(y) = 0,
a(y) _0.
(045)





s'(y) = (P(y) - F"- (y)]f(y), (046)
A2 ,0 and Ass=0:
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Ay 0 and AsP +- -a) 0. (055) U(vi, sr) = w - :i) + psi~ + U;(0, 0) = ci + Ui(0, 0).
An analysis of these first order conditions gives the following proposition.
PropositonZ Asawwethat (v,o) ismonotouicaly isciwasig vfor any aoant. If (a(vg),
P(vg)) isth optimnal prvtiation scheme, then for any vi e10,0si, either a(u.) .= a or P(vj) = "1v)
&srthenaors, oth asccnnot car at the sams time.
Puroof:: Since
#(vi = j A+ (1 2A(1-A -p- (v i))-Ap 9v
where q(v.) is the hazard function of distribution f (vi), we have
# PL'~UEiRfviJ + 0(Uif(iE) = [-ui(1 - 2A) - Aq(v)(-..-P s-)f(vj) + (A + (1- 2A)(1l 3--)vjf (vi)P(..') Pu)
Thus, the first order condition 0 becomes
- A O -~)+ AaIQ,) + [..(1 -A)(i -1) + Jjf(v,) ="
which is concave in xzj.
Step 4
An Implication of the optimal schene for privatization is the follown:
Corollary 1 If ao(v,) end P'(vj) sre thos-give b Proposition 5, then it is newe incentive compatible
to jetlreservation prices.
Proof: Since o(v,) <13 alwsys, #(ti,a(v.)) > 0 always. Therefore, no reservation prices are needed.
Q.E.D.
Step 5
We will now show that if any "bundhilg" happens, It oni, happens at the lower end of the spectrum
of v.
Proposition 8 Asume that 4vu,,a) is mnonotonacetlpimcreasing in vi for ay a constant. If therewexits
(a, b), each that a(v,) = aL for nitu E (o, b), then them, does not exist its inters (c, o) such that P(vj)
F"'(u,) for aeli e 6(ca).
Proof: It is illustrative to prove the case that b =-0. All other cases can be proved in the same spirit.
Supposing the opposite, lets an arbitrary point In (c, a). In other words,: <oa. Flom the last proposition,
we know that a(o) =agand a(z) >a.Since for allvi, a(v)= 3pf T(CO<O0) ,this Impliesthat
P(:) > P(a). In the following, a contradiction to this is found.
Insa neighourhood of s, by Proposition S.
P(s) =-'()
Moreover, from the proof of Proposition 5 ( equations (056) and (053) ), In the neighborhood of :,
As = 0. This implies that in that neighborhood s(z) = 0, which means that, from equation (045),
~~~~JjP(s)()ds P's.~ ~ s
However,
jP(s)f()ds = f'P(s)()ds+f P(s)Jf(g)ds = f' F' (s) ()ds + JP(s)(s)dus.
(056)
Suppose that in a neighiborhood of vi, a(evs) > a and P(vd) # F"'(v). These imply that both
Asand As are 0 (the constraints are net binding). According to equation (056), one can see that Al1
-(1--A)(1.-p)v, -AJ. Thus, by equation (053), A: _-AI = (1-A)(I1- 0) >0. This is acontradiction.
Therefore, at any point vd, either a(vi) - a or P(vj) =
Suppose the opposite is true, iLe , o(vj) - a and P(vj) = F"'(,.). This is dearly impossible, since
We~+ (a " 1$)P' = (a - 1)(n -1)F"-(vj)f(v,) < 0,
Q.E.D.
Le., constraint (15) is violated.
Let u s e k that the global incentive constraints are satisfied by our solution, i.e., U(v,,) is globally







P(a)[F(b) - F(a)]= /F"-1(a)dF(s) > F"-(a)[F(b) - F(a)],
since P(v.) is constant in (a,b) and F(.) is increasing in (a,b). Therefore
P(a) > F"-'(a) > F"-1(z)= P(:).
Thus, a contradiction is found.
Q.E.D.
Step d
Finally, we can show that some bunching is always optimal. Suppose that there is no bunching at all
in 10,0], then P(vi) = F"- 1 (vj) holds for all vi. Thus, P(0) =0, which Is Impossible.
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